Mining and the World Heritage Convention: Democratic Legitimacy and Treaty Compliance by Affolder, Nathasha
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 1 Winter 2007 Article 3
January 2007
Mining and the World Heritage Convention:
Democratic Legitimacy and Treaty Compliance
Nathasha Affolder
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nathasha Affolder, Mining and the World Heritage Convention: Democratic Legitimacy and Treaty
Compliance, 24 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 35 (2007)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/3
FOURTH IUCN
ACADEMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
WORLDWIDE COLLOQUIUM:
IMPLEMENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION:
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
Mining and the World Heritage Convention:
Democratic Legitimacy and
Treaty Compliance
NATASHA AFFOLDER*
SYNOPSIS
International treaties and the institutions which administer
them are increasingly the subjects of democratic scrutiny. In re-
cent disputes surrounding mining projects in and around World
Heritage Sites, the legitimacy of the World Heritage Convention
regime has been attacked for a host of democratic failings. These
accusations of "democratic deficits" originate from both opponents
and supporters of the Convention regime. They challenge the
compatibility of international processes with national law and in-
stitutions, raise questions of accountability and transparency, and
revisit tensions between state sovereignty and common heritage.
To foster compliance with the World Heritage Convention, we
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need to boldly engage with and address these democratic
critiques.
I. INTRODUCTION
The World Heritage Convention ("Convention") was adopted
by the General Conference of the United Nations Education, Sci-
entific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") in 1972 to protect
internationally outstanding national and cultural heritage from a
variety of threats-many of which not only persist, but have in-
tensified to date. In recent clashes surrounding mining projects
on the borders of World Heritage Sites in Canada, Australia and
the United States, the Convention has been transformed from a
fairly innocuous and unknown international treaty to an instru-
ment of "foreign domination"' and "a new model of "U.N. Take-
over."2 Controversies over World Heritage Site listing and danger
listing processes, and the unclear consequences of site nomination
for surrounding natural resource industry projects, have resulted
in particularly venomous attacks on an international regime cre-
ated to preserve natural and cultural areas of "outstanding uni-
versal value."'3 "World Heritage," reported a biologist after
visiting the contested Daintree Rainforest World Heritage Site,
should be "uttered with a disgusted, bitter expression, as though
the person had just tasted something awful and needed to spit."4
Interest in the "democratic deficits" of international environ-
mental law is emerging from a range of scholars, judges, activists,
and commentators of diverse perspectives. Although the Conven-
tion has attracted little scholarly analysis, it is not immune to
challenges from both popular and academic sources in this wave of
heightened scrutiny of international processes and institutions.
In 1999, Daniel Bodansky warned that the perception that "the
international environmental process is insufficiently democratic"
would grow to pose an increasingly significant challenge for inter-
1. Amy Ridenour, Keep the Statute of Liberty Free: An Argument for Congres-
sional Oversight of U.N. Land Designations in the U.S., NAT'L POL'Y ANALYSIS, July
2002, http://www.nationalcenter.org(NPA419.html.
2. Kim A. O'Connell, Groups Foster Alarm About U.N. Park Takeover, NAT'L
PARKS, July-Aug. 1996, at 26, 26.
3. See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Con-
vention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
pmbl., Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37 [hereinafter Convention].
4. William Laurance, Confrontation in the Outback: A Tropical Biologist's Tale,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 8, 2000, at B12.
[Vol. 24
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/3
2007] MINING AND THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION37
national environmental law. 5 It has. For example, in the conflicts
surrounding the New World Mine near Yellowstone National
Park, the Jabiluka Mine near Kakadu National Park, and the
Cheviot Mine near Jasper National Park mining interests have
been pitted against World Heritage protection in the United
States, Australia, and Canada. These disputes evidence the ex-
tent to which perceptions of democratic illegitimacy can threaten
to undermine a regime created to hold states accountable for the
protection of heritage of "outstanding universal value" within
their borders.
One step towards improving treaty compliance comes from
identifying, understanding, and disaggregating the threats to
such compliance.6 Accusations of democratic illegitimacy pose one
potent (yet rarely identified) threat to compliance with the inter-
national norms articulated in the World Heritage Convention.
These challenges have not been balanced by articulations of the
democratic strengths of the Convention regime. Indeed, these
democratic complaints may appear to be re-tooled versions of ear-
lier attacks on the Convention once framed as objections based on
sovereignty. Accusations of democratic flaws have a particular po-
tency that, if left unchecked, will only intensify the challenge of
fostering compliance with international environmental law.
II. BACKGROUND: THE WORLD HERITAGE
CONVENTION AND A TALE OF THREE MINES
A. The World Heritage Convention
The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage ("World Heritage Convention" or "Convention")
came into force in 1975 and has been ratified by 183 countries. 7
The Convention is marked by an unresolved tension between state
sovereignty and the recognition that certain structures, sites, and
areas constitute the heritage not just of individual nations, but of
humankind. The Convention reaffirms the international interest
5. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law? 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 596 (1999).
6. I admit some difficulty in using the term "compliance" here. Compliance re-
flects the degree of conformity between a state's behavior and a treaty's explicit rules.
The Convention lacks such definite and precise rules governing mining and World
Heritage. Its broadly stated obligations allow states to justify a range of conduct as
compatible with the Convention.
7. This total reflects the number of States Parties as of October 26, 2006. See
States Parties - UNESCO World Heritage Centre, http://whc.unesco.orglen/states
parties (last visited Mar 26, 2007).
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in the protection of these sites.8 At the same time, the Convention
also explicitly articulates respect for the "sovereignty of the States
on whose territory the cultural and natural heritage ... is situ-
ated" and operates "without prejudice to property rights provided
by national legislation."9
Much of the normative content of the current World Heritage
regime is contained in the Operational Guidelines, which are cre-
ated and frequently revised by the World Heritage Committee
("Committee"). 10 As well as updating the Operational Guidelines,
the Committee performs the gatekeeper functions of deciding
which nominated sites will be included on the World Heritage
List, 1 will be on the List of World Heritage in Danger ("Danger
List"),12 or should be removed from either list. The Committee is
comprised of twenty-one elected States Parties and is assisted in
its work by both a Bureau and by its advisory bodies, the World
Conservation Union ("IUCN"), the International Council on Mon-
8. Robert L. Meyer, Travaux Preparatoires for the UNESCO World Heritage
Convention, 2 EARTH L.J. 45, 45-46 (1976).
9. Convention, supra note 3, art. 6, 1. The full text of Article 6, paragraph 1 of
the Convention illustrates this tension between sovereignty and communal
obligation:
Whilst fully respecting the sovereignty of the States on whose territory
the cultural and natural heritage mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 is situ-
ated, and without prejudice to property rights provided by national legis-
lation, the States Parties to this Convention recognize that such heritage
constitutes a world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of the in-
ternational community as a whole to co-operate.
Id. The conflicting mandates to respect national sovereignty and to recognize commu-
nal obligations based on a collective interest are repeated in paragraph 15 of
UNESCO's Operational Guidelines, which was created to implement the Convention:
"While fully respecting the sovereignty of the States on whose territory the cultural
and natural heritage is situated, States Parties to the Convention recognize the col-
lective interest of the international community to cooperate in the protection of this
heritage." U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Intergovernmental
Comm. for the Prot. of the World Cultural & Natural Heritage, Operational Guide-
lines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention, 15, U.N. Doc. WHC.
05/2 (Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide05-en.pdf [here-
inafter Operational Guidelines].
10. See OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 9.
11. Convention, supra note 3, art. 11, T 2. As of May 15, 2006, there were 830
properties included on the World Heritage List. United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization, World Heritage Centre, World Heritage List, http:fl
whc.unesco.org/en/listl (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). This represents 644 cultural, 162
natural and 24 mixed properties in 138 States Parties. Id.
12. Convention, supra note 3, art. 11, 4. The Danger List contains those sites
for which "major operations are necessary and for which assistance has been re-
quested .. " Id.
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uments and Sites ("ICOMOS") and the International Centre for
Conservation in Rome ("ICCROM"). 13
B. A Tale of Three Mines
1. The Jabiluka Mine, Kakadu National Park,
Australia
Kakadu National Park is listed on the World Heritage List for
both its natural and cultural heritage properties. 14 When the
park was nominated for inclusion on the World Heritage List, the
property containing the Jabiluka mine was specifically excluded
from the nomination, as was property containing two pre-existing
mines, resulting in three "holes" in the Site. 15 The mine site thus
occupied property just outside the boundaries of the Park in what
could technically be designated a buffer zone. Scientists and con-
servation groups notified the World Heritage Committee in 1997
and 1998 that proposals to mine the Jabiluka deposit posed a
threat to the integrity of Kakadu. 16
To investigate the threats the mine posed to the cultural and
natural heritage of Kakadu, the Committee decided in June, 1998,
to send a mission of experts to Kakadu. The team was led by the
chairperson of the World Heritage Committee, Professor Fran-
cesco Francioni, and included representatives from the scientific
advisory agencies, the IUCN and ICOMOS. 17 After consultation
with a wide range of stakeholders including different levels of gov-
ernment, aboriginal groups, and conservation organizations, the
team expressed "grave concern" about the threat of the mining
project to the World Heritage Site.' 8
13. Id. art. 8.
14. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World
Heritage, Kakadu National Park, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/147 (last visited Feb. 9,
2007).
15. Graeme Aplin, Kakadu National Park World Heritage Site: Deconstructing the
Debate, 1997-2003, 42 AuSTRALAN GEOGRAPHICAL STUD. 152 (2004).
16. U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Bureau of the World Heri-
tage Comm., Reports on the State of Conservation of Specific Properties Inscribed on
the World Heritage List, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. WHC.97/CONF.207/2 (Sept. 30, 1997),
available at http://whc.unesco.orgarchive/1997/whc-97-conf2O7-2e.pdf; see also The
Wilderness Society, Kakadu: World Heritage in Danger-Submission to World Heri-
tage Committee (Oct. 31, 1998), http://www.wilderness.org.au/campaigns/northern
australia/kakadu/jabwhsub2.
17. S. Javed Maswood, Kakadu and the Politics of World Heritage Listing 54 Aus-
TRALIAN J. INT'L AFF. 357, 357 (2000).
18. Aplin, supra note 15, at 162.
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An extraordinary session of the World Heritage Committee
was convened specifically to decide whether to add Kakadu Na-
tional Park to the Danger List in 1999.19 All three advisory bodies
to the Committee (IUCN, ICOMOS, and ICCROM) favoured such
a danger listing and supported the view of the mission that min-
ing adjacent to the park should not proceed.20 The Australian
government opposed listing Kakadu on the Danger List and un-
dertook extensive lobbying of the Committee to prevent such a
listing.21 Ultimately, the Committee decided not to inscribe the
park on the Danger List despite the earlier recommendations of
the mission and its advisory bodies. 22 With respect to the cultural
values of the park, the Committee urged the Australian govern-
ment to consult with the Mirrar traditional owners (who had ap-
pealed for Committee intervention). 23 In 2004, the Committee
applauded the news that the mining company Energy Resources
of Australia had committed that no mining would take place at
Jabiluka without the agreement of the Mirrar people. 24
2. The New World Mine, Yellowstone National Park,
USA
Yellowstone National Park, the world's first national park,
was inscribed on the Danger List in 1995 as a result of number of
threats to the park, including the New World mine.25 Proposals
for the development of this gold and copper mine three miles
outside the park boundary were brought to the attention of the
Committee by the Delegate of the United States.26 The Commit-
19. Catherine Redgwell, The International Law of Public Participation: Protected
Areas, Endangered Species, and Biological Diversity, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES 187, 199 (Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas, &
George (Rock) Pring eds., 2002).
20. Id. at 199-200.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 200.
23. Id. at 200-01.
24. U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO), World Heritage Comm.,
Decisions Adopted at the 28th Session of the World Heritage Committee, at 92, U.N.
Doc. WHC-04/28.COM26 (Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://whc.unesco.orglarchive/
2004/whc04-28com-26e.pdf.
25. Daniel L. Gebert, Sovereignty Under the World Heritage Convention: A Ques-
tionable Basis for Limiting Federal Land Designation Pursuant to International
Agreements, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 427, 427-28 (1998). Other threats to the park
included tourism and related infrastructure developments and potential threats from
nearby hydrothermal exploitation of oil and gas deposits. See id. at 428.
26. U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Bureau of the World Heri-
tage Comm., 18th Sess., July 4-9, 1994, Report of the Rapporteur, at 16, U.N. Doc.
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tee also received detailed documentation on the situation from
fourteen North American conservation organizations. 27 Unlike
the situation at Kakadu, the request for a mission to Yellowstone
came from the National Park Service and the Assistant Secretary
of Fish and Wildlife and was supported by the Observer from the
United States.28 The mission was carried out in September 1995
(before the domestic environmental impact process was com-
pleted) and discussed at the Committee's Nineteenth Extraordi-
nary Session, which was held in December 1995.29
In its decision to place Yellowstone National Park on the Dan-
ger List, the Committee noted:
[Wihether the State Party should grant a permit to the mining
company or not is entirely a domestic decision of the State
Party. It was further stated that there is no wording in the Con-
vention or the Operational Guidelines which could lead to an
interference in sovereignty. It was also noted that even if the
State Party did not request action, the Committee still had an
independent responsibility to take action based on the informa-
tion it had gathered.30
The threat the mine posed to the park was eventually elimi-
nated when the Clinton administration negotiated a land swap,
allowing the federal government to acquire Crown Butte's inter-
ests in the mine.3 1 In 2003, the World Heritage Committee re-
moved Yellowstone National Park from the Danger List.32
However, the legacy of this example of the handing over of control
"of public lands to foreign entities" remains powerful. 33 The inac-
WHC-94/CONF.001/10 (Aug. 19, 1994), available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/
1994/whc-94-conf001-10e.pdf.
27. U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Bureau of the World Heri-
tage Comm., 19th Sess., July 3-8, 1995, Report of the Rapporteur, at 23, U.N. Doc.
WHC-95/CONF.201/12 (July 31, 1995), available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/
1995/whc-95-conf201-12e.pdf.
28. See id.
29. U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Bureau of the World Heri-
tage Comm., 19th Extraordinary Sess., Berlin, F.R.G., Dec. 4-9, 1995, Report of the
Bureau, at 20-21, U.N. Doc. WHC-95/CONF.203/4 (Jan. 31, 1996), available at http:l!
whc.unesco.org/archive/repbu95b.htm.
30. Id. at 21,
31. Gebert, supra note 25, at 428.
32. See U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], World Heritage
Comm., Decisions Adopted by the 27th Session of the World Heritage Committee in
2003, U.N. Doc. WHC-03/27.COM124 (Dec. 10, 2003), available at http://whc.unesco.
org/archive/decrec03.htm.
33. Gebert, supra note 25, at 429.
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curate but potent image of the U.N.'s "black helicopters" flying
over and policing American lands spawned by the Committee's
mission to Yellowstone poses a real threat to the popular legiti-
macy of the Convention. 34
3. The Cheviot Mine, Jasper National Park, Canada
Like the New World and Jabiluka mines, the Cheviot mine
was proposed not within the Jasper National Park boundary, but
a few kilometres outside the park. Challenge to the Alberta gov-
ernment's approval of the mine came from local and national con-
servation groups who warned that permitting a mine on the
border of Jasper National Park would amount to a breach of Ca-
nada's obligations under the Convention.35 Parks Canada repre-
sentatives had similarly testified before the Cheviot mine
environmental review panel that the mine could jeopardize Ca-
nada's ability to meet its international obligations under the Con-
vention. 36 The potential threat to the National Park posed by the
mine was brought to the attention of the Committee by the IUCN
in 1997. 3 7
In March 1998, the director of the Committee requested that
Canada's ambassador to UNESCO arrange for Canada to consult
with Alberta about reconsidering its Cheviot mine approval. 38 Po-
litical responses to this "international pressure" varied from reas-
34. See id. at 429-30.
35. See Dennis Hryciuk, Mine Foes Vow to Fight Back; Environmentalists Eye In-
ternational Focus to Protest Cheviot, EDMONTON J., June 19, 1997, at B5; Ed Struzik,
Sierra Club Opposes Cheviot Mine Project, EDMONTON J., Sept. 10, 1997, at B5; Stop
the Cheviot Mine!: Legal Action Launched Over Proposed Cheviot Mine, WILD LANDS
ADvoc., Dec. 1997, available at http://www.ualberta.ca/ERSC/cheviot/chevlegal97.
htm.
36. See Making Mountain Park a Reality: Cheviot Mine, http://www.cpaws-
edmonton.org/cheviot/index html?mainpage-name=home reference#AhotSpotofBio
logicalDiversity (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). Jasper National Park forms part of the
Canadian Rocky Mountains Park World Heritage Site. Id.
37. See U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Bureau of the World
Heritage Comm., 25th Extraordinary Sess., Naples, Italy, Nov. 28-29, 1997, Reports
on the State of Conservation of Specific Properties Inscribed on the World Heritage
List, at 6, U.N. Doc. WHC-97/CONF.207/2 (Sep. 30, 1997), available at http://whc.
unesco.org/archive/1997/whc-97-conf207-2e.pdf.
38. See U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO), Bureau of the World
Heritage Comm., 25th Extraordinary Sess., Naples, Italy, Nov. 28-29, 1997, Report of
the Rapporteur, at 5, U.N. Doc. WHC-97/CONF.207/5, available at http://whc.unesco.
org/archive/1997/whc-97-conf207-5e.pdf; U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org.
[UNESCO], World Heritage Comm., 21st Sess., Naples, Italy, Dec. 1-6, 1997, Report,
at 21, U.N. Doc. WHC-97/CONF.208/17 (Feb. 27, 1998), available at http://whc.
unesco.org/archive/1997/whc-97-conf208-17e.pdf.
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surance on the federal level that Ottawa was taking the UNESCO
request seriously39 to outrage on the provincial level, expressed by
the Albertan Environment Minister Ty Lund in the media: "It re-
ally bothers me when people from some other part of the world
start telling the people of Alberta how to operate in the Province of
Alberta. '40 Danger listing of Jasper National Park as a result of
an approval of the Cheviot Mine did not occur, but the issue con-
tinues to be monitored by the Committee. 41
III. WHAT IS THE DEMOCRACY PROBLEM IN THE
WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION? 42
In controversies over the Cheviot mine, the New World mine,
and the Jabiluka mine, a host of democratic flaws of the Conven-
tion regime are identified. In part, they reflect the "paranoid
lather"43 into which talk show hosts whipped their listeners dur-
ing heated debates, and are based on misunderstandings of the
operation of the Convention:
What do the Statue of Liberty, Independence Hall, Jeffer-
son's Monticello and Yellowstone National Park all have in
common?
Each of these national treasures is now regulated according
to the dictates of foreign bureaucrats rather than according to
the will of the American people.
[Site designations can be made] unilaterally without congres-
sional approval.
39. Ed Struzik, Feds to Co-operate with U.N. Request for Data on Project,
EDMONTON J., March 20, 1998, at A6 (response of Andy Mitchell).
40. See Les Sillars, This Land is Their Land: UNESCO asks Ottawa to Revoke
Approval of Alberta's Cheviot Mine, B.C. REP., April 6, 1998, at 22.
41. In its 2006 session, the Committee requested that Canada ensure that "ad-
verse impacts of the operation of the Cheviot Mine on the integrity of the property are
minimized and mitigated." U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], World
Heritage Comm., Decisions Adopted at the 30th Session of the World Heritage Com-
mittee, at 66, U.N. Doc. WHC-06/30.COM/19 (Aug. 23, 2006), available at http://whc.
unesco.org/archive/2006/whc06-30com-19e.pdf.
42. With apologies to Kal Raustiala, who asks "What is the Democracy Problem in
International Law?" in Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 401, 409 (2000).
43. Jonathan B. Tourtellot, U.S. Wary of World-Heritage Status, Travel Editor
Says, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Oct. 10, 2003, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/
news/2003/10/1010_031010 worldheritage.html.
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Under the terms of the World Heritage Treaty, the presi-
dent doesn't need to consult anyone before placing U.S. territory
under the thumb of the United Nations.44
UNESCO is portrayed as an "organization of the United Nations
that is anti-American, anti-Constitution and bent on one world
government" and which "claims control" over more than a dozen
U.S. World Heritage Sites.45
While it may be tempting to dismiss such criticisms outright
as inaccurate and overstated, these criticisms expose wider con-
cerns about the democratic credentials of international environ-
mental law-making processes. Simply put, they raise questions
about the representative and accountable nature of decision-mak-
ing and whether such decision-making should proceed at the local,
rather than the international, level. While climate change, ozone
depletion, and the law of the sea may be accepted as environmen-
tal concerns appropriate for international regulation, decision-
making surrounding land use, heritage protection, and natural re-
source extraction are more fiercely guarded as issues of local gov-
ernance. Democracy problems are both real and imagined. The
imagined problems are no less significant than the real ones as
they represent threats to the popular legitimacy of the Convention
that may be as significant as any threats to its normative
legitimacy. 46
A. Misunderstanding World Heritage Processes
In attacks on the democratic credentials of the Convention
mounted in the course of disputes over mining, a wide variety of
(often conflicting) criticisms emerge. The most frequent misun-
derstandings of the Convention surround the question of who
nominates a site for inclusion on the World Heritage List and the
legal consequences of World Heritage Site listing. World Heritage
Site nominations are portrayed in the media and in political de-
bates as entirely U.N.-initiated exercises. The critical role of the
44. Elizabeth McGeehan, U.S. Sovereignty Violated by Allowing U.N. to Control
U.S. Historic Sites, Knight Ridder/Trib. News Service, June 30, 1999.
45. Richard J. Rees, Stay out of UNESCO, MANSFIELD NEWS J., Dec. 18, 1993, at
4a.
46. See Bodansky's discussion of popular and normative legitimacy in The Legiti-
macy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environ-
mental Law. See Bodansky, supra note 5, at 601 ("Authority has popular legitimacy if
the subjects to whom it is addressed accept it as justified .... On the other hand,
'legitimacy' can also have a normative meaning, referring to whether a claim of au-
thority is well founded-whether it is justified in some objective sense.").
[Vol. 24
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state in site nominations is ignored. 47 Despite frequent attempts
to clarify this misunderstanding, it is frequently repeated. 48 The
consequences of World Heritage listing are similarly misunder-
stood with rumours circulating that "listing results in the state's
loss of legal title to the area inscribed on the List."49
These misunderstandings are not unique to any one country
and permeate conflicts in Australia, Canada, and the United
States. An Australian legislative inquiry identified conflict associ-
ated with World Heritage Sites in Australia as emanating "from
the confusion within the Australian polity about the nature of the
Convention, how properties are listed and the nature of the man-
agement regimes entailed."50 The authors of a study examining
World Heritage designations in the United States similarly con-
cluded that "the majority of the population in the USA is ignorant
and confused by the Convention."51 Comparable observations are
made with respect to designations in Canada. 52
Such misunderstandings are well illustrated by the frenzy
which surrounded the New World mine project. The role of the
U.S. government was ignored by critics characterizing the inscrip-
tion of Yellowstone on the Danger List as the result of unwelcome
collaborations of environmental advocacy groups and the U.N.: "It
is astonishing that a group of extreme environmentalists can in-
vite in a few folks from the United Nations to circumvent laws
47. Article 3 of the Convention states that it is for each State Party to identify the
potential World Heritage Site within its territory. Convention, supra note 3, art. 3.
Article 11, paragraph 3 requires state consent for inclusion of a property in the World
Heritage List. Id. art. 11, 3.
48. In Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, a
tribunal of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID")
attempted to clarify this misunderstanding, noting that the "choice of sites to be pro-
tected is not imposed externally, but results instead from the State's own voluntary
nomination." S. Pac. Props. (Middle E.) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 3 ICSID (W.
Bank) 189, 225 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 933, 966 (1993).
49. Trudie-Ann Atherton & Trevor C. Atherton, The Power and the Glory: Na-
tional Sovereignty and the World Heritage Convention, 69 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 631, 648
(1995).
50. Tony Corbett & Marcus B. Lane, World Heritage in Australia: An Uncertain
Future, AUSTRALIAN PARKS & RECREATION, Spring 2006, at 39, 39.
51. Kevin Williams, The Meanings and Effectiveness of World Heritage Designa-
tion in the USA, 7 CURRENT ISSUES IN TOURISM 412, 414 (2004).
52. Heritage Resources Centre, Toward Greater Understanding and Use of the
World Heritage Convention, Proceedings from a Canadian Seminar on the World Heri-
tage Convention (1993) (edited by J.G. Nelson & E.A. Alder).
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that Americans and Montanans have worked hard for and lent
their voices to."'53
It is not possible, however, to attribute all the rancour ex-
pressed to confusion and misunderstandings. For some, the very
concept of World Heritage or common heritage is objectionable.
Any international level of governance for issues affecting local
land use will be regarded with suspicion and hostility.5 4
B. Failed Participatory Processes at the National Level
Undermine International Processes
A significant source of criticism in the mining disputes dis-
cussed here resides in expressions of surprise that World Heritage
designations have domestic consequences for mining projects pro-
posed adjacent to these sites. This surprise is significant, as it
reveals the lack of clarity with respect to the legal status of re-
source extraction in and around World Heritage Sites. Commen-
tators thus express shock both that mining may be illegal in or
around World Heritage Sites and, conversely, that it may not be.
The lack of clarity governing the status of mining in and around
protected areas creates uncertainty and dissatisfaction for a wide
range of stakeholders. If mining activities are found to be incom-
patible with World Heritage Site status, then the processes by
which such sites were initially proposed come under scrutiny and
are often found lacking in terms of democratic process.
Part of the mismatch between the processes of site nomina-
tion and contemporary expectations of community residents, con-
servation groups, and mining companies is a result of an evolution
of participatory norms in natural resource decision-making. 55 The
Convention is fairly antiquated as an international environmental
law instrument, and it predates many of the advances in par-
ticipatory processes articulated in more recent instruments such
53. Todd Wilkinson, Global Warning, NAT'L PARKS, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 34, 38
(quoting Montana Senator Conrad Burns); see also O'Connell, supra note 2.
54. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 345, 360 (2000) ("Highly educated and mobile transnational elites may
feel comfortable with decision-making at the international level, but this may evoke a
visceral reaction from local communities who may be hostile to international
institutions.").
55. For an excellent discussion of this evolution, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES (Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas, &
George (Rock) Pring eds., 2002)
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as the Aarhus Convention. 56 Criticisms of the Convention are
often not about any procedural defect at the international level
but rather articulate frustration with closed, non-participatory
processes for site nomination at the national level. The failure of
national governments to adequately consult stakeholders-in-
cluding sub-federal units in federal states, community interests,
mining interests, and affected indigenous peoples-in nominating
sites significantly undermines the Convention.
1. Australia
The World Heritage Convention has received more popular
judicial and political attention in Australia than in any other
country. Legally, the Convention has been the subject of signifi-
cant litigation before both the High Court and the Federal Court
and has occupied a central role in the development of Australian
constitutional law.57 The Convention has mobilized public opin-
ion, both for and against, particular site nominations and projects
and has even ignited debate in several federal election
campaigns. 58
The nomination of the Daintree Rainforest in Queensland in
1987 and the Tasmanian Dam and Tasmanian Wilderness have
been among the most contentious site nominations in Australia
and reveal the extent to which conflicts arise in the absence of
collaboration between different levels of government and stake-
holders. 59 The nomination of the Daintree Rainforest by the Com-
monwealth government unleashed a "heritage war" between the
Queensland and Commonwealth governments that was fought out
in the Australian courts. 60
An analysis of the public comment made to an inquiry initi-
ated in 1995 by the House of Representatives Standing Committee
56. The World Heritage Convention predates the Aarhus Convention by over 25
years. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Envi-
ronmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (entered into force Oct. 30, 2001).
57. See Ben Boer & Graeme Wiffen, HERITAGE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 63-89 (2006).
58. Id. The Tasmanian Dam and Tasmanian Wilderness listing became a federal
election issue in the 1983 federal election with the Commonwealth government enact-
ing the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act of 1983 to specifically implement
the Convention. Id. at 64.
59. See generally Donald R. Rothwell & Ben Boer, The Influence of International
Environmental Law on Australian Courts, 7 REV. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY & INT'L
ENVTL. L. 31 (1998).
60. For a discussion of this litigation and the Australian High Court's affirmation
of the Commonwealth government's role in giving effect to the Convention, see id.
13
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on Environment, Recreation and the Arts ("HORSCERA") on the
Management of Australian World Heritage Areas reveals the com-
mon perception that the nomination process proceeds absent con-
sultation with affected parties:
With regard to consultation, an almost unanimous concern
of resident communities and State and local government author-
ities was the absence of consultation during the nomination pro-
cess. One local resident said of the Willandra Lakes
nomination: "we learnt of the Willandra nomination via the
newspapers, no notification, no consultation . . . just bang,
you're nominated."61
Flawed consultation processes intensify suspicion toward the con-
cept of World Heritage as an effective conservation or land man-
agement tool.62 They prevent opportunities to dispel rumours and
misunderstandings surrounding the processes and implications of
a site designation.
Recent Australian legislation, the Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, requires the Australian
Government, prior to submitting a nominated property to the
Committee for inclusion on the World Heritage List, to use "its
best endeavours to reach agreement" with any person who owns or
occupies such property and with the government of the State or
Territory where the property is located. 63 This act also expressly
provides that a failure to comply with these requirements "does
not affect the submission of a property to the World Heritage
Committee for inclusion in the World Heritage List or the status
of a property as a declared World Heritage property."64 It further
requires public notice to be given when nominations are submitted
to the World Heritage Committee, when the boundaries of the
property are changed, or when the property is added or removed
from the World Heritage List.65
2. The United States
The United States was an early instigator of the World Heri-
tage concept in the 1970s but is now the source of some of the most
61. Corbett & Lane, supra note 50, at 41.
62. Id.
63. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, § 314(1), (2)
(Austl.).
64. Id. § 314(3).
65. Id. § 315(1).
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vocal attacks on the Convention. A powerful source of criticism of
the Convention stems from the absence of a congressional role in
the processes for site nomination and maintenance decisions. 66
Members of the U.S. Congress introduced the American Land Sov-
ereignty Protection Act as a legislative response to this democratic
accountability gap. 67 This legislation is intended to give Congress
a central role in the designation process by allowing Congress to
control the designation of sites.68 This act has been introduced
into both the House of Representatives and the Senate a number
of times but has yet to be enacted into law.69 Analysis of the sub-
missions made in debates surrounding this act reveals the fears
and misunderstandings informing the debate. Congressman Don
Young of Alaska criticized use of the Convention, commenting
that "if the U.N. is allowed to gain control of the world's natural
resources, it can control the nation's economy and therefore its
people." 70 At a legislative hearing on the act, U.S. Representative
Tim Hutchinson from Arkansas said,
Arkansans feel just as strongly about the issue of American
sovereignty. They're offended when American troops are placed
under foreign command. They're outraged when American
soldiers are forced to wear United Nations uniforms or face a
dishonorable discharge. And they're incensed when American
land is designated an international reserve and subjected to in-
ternational restrictions.71
U.S. Representative Helen Chenoweth of Idaho commented that
the Bill was an important piece of legislation given the need to
address the "UN's insatiable appetite to interfere with U.S. land
management policy."72
The United States' participation in the Convention is pro-
vided for by the National Historic Preservation Act Amendments
66. Matthew Machado, Mounting Opposition to Biosphere Reserves and World
Heritage Sites in the United States Sparked by Claims of Interference with National
Sovereignty, 1997 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. Y.B. 120, 124-26 (1997).
67. See id. at 120, 126-29; American Land Sovereignty Protection Act of 1996,
H.R. 3752, 104th Cong. § 2 (2d Sess. 1996).
68. H.R. 3752 § 3. The Act also gives Congress control over designating land as a
Biosphere Reserve under UNESCO's Man and Biosphere Program. Id. § 4.
69. See Machado, supra note 66, at 127.
70. Sovereignty Over Public Lands: Hearing on H.R. 3752 Before the H. Comm. on
Resources, 104th Cong., 7-8 (1996) (press materials submitted by the Honorable Helen
Chenowith).
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 6.
15
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of 198073 and regulations. 74 This legislation requires notification
of the relevant committees of the House and Senate of all pending
proposals when the Department of the Interior decides to nomi-
nate a property. 75 It also requires written consent of every prop-
erty owner before that owner's property can be nominated.76
Silence or opposition from one owner could therefore prevent a
nomination from being made.77
Apart from criticisms arising from ideological opposition to
the Convention, challenges are also the product of misunderstand-
ings arising from the fact that the most recent U.S. Tentative List
(called the Indicative Inventory of 1982)78 is extremely dated and
has not been updated to reflect developments in the Operational
Guidelines.79 The U.S. Park Service acknowledges the absence of
consultation that marked the creation of the 1982 list:
Before including sites in the Inventory, neither in 1982 nor
since did the National Park Service consult property owners or
other stakeholders, such as State and local governments, to the
extent that would be deemed appropriate today. In any case, af-
ter a quarter-century, a full review of owner interest is merited
before including or retaining sites on a new Tentative List.80
The Office of International Affairs of the U.S. Park Service is
currently cooperating with the George Wright Society to prepare a
new U.S. Tentative List of nominated sites. The Park Service
states that this list is being prepared with the involvement of
property owners and other stakeholders.8 1
73. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-1, a-2 (2000).
74. 36 C.F.R. §§73.1-73.17 (2006).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-l(b).
76. Id. § 470a-1(c).
77. See 36 C.F.R. § 73.7(b)(2)(iii).
78. See generally United States Department of the Interior, National Park Ser-
vice, Office of International Affairs, FAQ for U.S. World Heritage Tentative List Pro-
ject, http://www.nps.gov/oia/topics/worldheritage/faqtentativelist.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2007).
79. Williams, supra note 57, at 414.
80. See generally United States Department of the Interior, National Park Ser-
vice, Office of International Affairs, FAQ for U.S. World Heritage Tentative List Pro-
ject, http://www.nps.gov/oia/topics/worldheritage/faqtentativelist.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2007)
81. United States Department of the Interior, National Parks Service, Office of
International Affairs, U.S. World Heritage Tentative List Project, http://www.nps.
gov/oia/topics/worldheritage/tentativelist.htm (last visited Feb.28, 2007).
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3. Canada
World Heritage has a low profile in Canada although nomina-
tions have, on occasion, attracted strong criticism-particularly
for their failure to consult affected interests. The nomination of
the Tatshenshini-Alsek region in northern British Columbia at-
tracted criticism because of the lack of consultation of First Na-
tions and of potentially affected mining interests. In federal
parliament, a request was made to withdraw the nomination in
1994 as "undemocratic and unsupported" since the nomination
was carried out "with absolutely no public discussion, input or
support."8 2 Local First Nations reported that they had not been
told about the World Heritage designation plan before it was an-
nounced.8 3 Facing significant opposition to the nomination based
on the lack of First Nations consultation, Prime Minister Camp-
bell reversed the nomination decision and instructed Canada's
representative on the Committee to request a deferment of the
application.8 4
The Tatshenshini-Alsek is not the only Canadian nomination
where a failure to consult Aboriginal peoples has been asserted.
The Council of Yukon Indians expressed concern that it was not
made aware of the nomination and designation of Kluane Na-
tional Park Reserve and that such designation might negatively
impact their land claims within the reserve's boundaries.8 5 Local
First Nations similarly expressed concern about the nomination of
Wood Buffalo National Park and the implications the nomination
would have for the traditional hunting and fishing grounds in the
area.8 6 These failures have largely been admitted by the Cana-
dian government.8 7
82. House of Commons Deb. 8995 (Dec. 13, 1994) (statement of Mr. Mike Scott,
Skeena, Ref.), available at www.parl.gc.ca/35/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/
143_94-12-13/143SM1E.html.
83. See e.g., Jamie Lamb, NDP Tat Move Would've Taken Bite Out of Land that
Feeds Us, THE VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 29, 1993, at A3.
84. Id.
85. Nancy Elliot, Origins, Impact and Future of World Heritage in Canada (June
1995) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Trent University) (on file with Pace Environmental
Law Review).
86. Id. at 93-94.
87. Tom McMillan, then-Minister of the Environment, recognized the lack of con-
sultation with local First Nations concerning the Wood Buffalo National Park nomi-
nation in a 1985 letter to the Fort Smith Joint Leadership Group:
I regret that you were not informed that the park was to be nominated as
a World Heritage Site... . It is a very distinctive honour, but it gives no
legal authority to UNESCO.... Please be assured that Wood Buffalo's
17
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Parks Canada occupies the lead role in selecting Canadian
sites and defining processes of nomination and has recently com-
piled an updated list of nominated sites, the 2004 Tentative List.88
In compiling this revised list, Parks Canada claimed "stakeholder
support was a key consideration."8 9 The Tentative List revisions
included two phases of consultation, including discussions with
representatives of all provincial and territorial governments, se-
lected Aboriginal organizations, national stakeholder groups, mu-
nicipal governments, and other stakeholders near whose
communities the sites were located.90 Admitting the lack of con-
sultation in the past, Parks Canada acknowledges:
Before 1990, the inscription process was viewed as the work of
experts and it was considered sufficient to have the support of
the relevant provincial government. Since 1990, nominations
have engaged the public to a much greater extent. In some
cases, the nomination process has been initiated by provincial or
local authorities .... In all cases, support for the nomination
from local communities and appropriate Aboriginal groups is re-
quired before a nomination is put forward.91
There are some indications that the Canadian government
has made efforts to increase local involvement. In 2001, local citi-
zens, themselves, nominated the Town of Lunenburg in Nova Sco-
tia for World Heritage designation with the support of the federal
government. 92
The governmental agencies responsible for World Heritage
Site nominations in Canada, the United States, and Australia
have all made recent commitments to involving stakeholders in
nomination decisions and consulting with local communities and
new status will not reduce your harvesting, hunting, trapping or fishing
rights.
Elliot, supra note 85, at 94.
88. While Parks Canada has been responsible for suggesting many of the sites for
nomination, provincial officials suggest that the idea of nominating Dinosaur Provin-
cial Park and Head-Smashed-In Buffalo Jump originated at the provincial level. See
Elliot, supra note 85, at 81-89.
89. Parks Canada, Updating Canada's Tentative List, http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/
spm-whs/page7_e.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
90. Parks Canada, Periodic Report on the Application of the World Heritage Con-
vention, § 1.2(b), (Dec. 2004), http://www.pc.gc.ca/docs/pm-whlrspm-whsr/index-e.asp.
91. Id. § 1.2(c).
92. See STANDING COMM. ON CANADIAN HERITAGE, EVIDENCE, at 1108 (May 17,
2001) (statement of Hon. Sheila Copps, Minister of Canadian Heritage) available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=55038.
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affected peoples. This commitment was made in Parks Service
communications in Canada and the United States. In Australia, it
is contained in legislation, although this legislation specifies that
failure to follow such requirement does not invalidate the nomina-
tion. These developments follow 1999 revisions to the Operational
Guidelines, expressing that participation of local people, various
levels of government, and non-governmental organizations
('NGOs") in the nomination process is essential.9 3 As there are no
stated consequences for a failure to adopt such participatory ap-
proaches, states are left to define their own standards of accept-
able consultation and participation in site nomination processes.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE EVOLVING NATURE
OF THE TREATY REGIME
A. Departures from Interstate Consensus
Concern about democratic accountability at the international
level traces to the power of the autonomous World Heritage Com-
mittee and the fact that much of the normative content of the
World Heritage regime is articulated in the Operational Guide-
lines rather than in the Convention itself. Professor Francesco
Francioni, a former chairman of the World Heritage Committee,
confirms this development:
The principle of evolutive interpretation, which means identify-
ing the meaning of a treaty provision not in light of the original
intent and circumstances existing at the time of its adoption,
but in light of the legal and social context at present, has found
a remarkable application in the evolving body of the Opera-
tional Guidelines, periodically reviewed by the Committee and
by innovative forms of treaty implementation, a notable exam-
ple of which is the introduction in 1995 of the notion of system-
atic monitoring through periodic reporting based on an
expansive reading of Article 29 [of the Convention]. 94
International environmental treaties are not expected to be
static. However, the development of norms requires some consen-
sual basis to be regarded as legitimate. This is usually achieved
93. Operational Guidelines, supra note 9, T 123.
94. Francesco Francioni, Professor, University of Siena, The International
Framework of Legal Instruments, in UNESCO World Heritage Centre Workshop, Si-
ena, Nov. 11-12, 2002, The Legal Tools for World Heritage Conservation: Abstracts, 4,
available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/Siena%20Abstracts.pdf.
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by the parties themselves "breathing new life" into agreements. 95
In other words, such "autonomous institutional arrangements"
usually involve some informal meetings of States Parties to mod-
ify convention regimes. 96
In contrast, the Committee produces new rules and obliga-
tions through amending the Operational Guidelines, a process
that requires the agreement of a two-thirds majority of its mem-
bership (which consists of 21 of the 182 States Parties).97 States
Parties may thus strenuously object to Committee decisions with-
out withdrawing from the Convention. "Exits" from international
regimes are rare.98
The evolution of treaties to create new rules and obligations
reveals why popular remedies to the democratic deficits in inter-
national law, such as greater parliamentary involvement in
treaty-making, only address the issue of democracy to a limited
extent and at a single point in time. Parliaments and other do-
mestic constituents may well support the original treaty text, but
this does not signify acceptance of the obligations which thereafter
evolve from the original text.
By ratifying the Convention, States Parties give general con-
sent to a rule-making regime that empowers the Committee to up-
date the Operational Guidelines.99 This general consent is
distinct from any specific consent over individual decisions.' 00
The evolution of norms beyond the obligations consented to in the
1972 Convention is visible in a range of areas that impact mining
and World Heritage Sites, including the power of the Committee
to add properties to the Danger List without specific state consent,
the articulation of buffer zones around sites, and the articulation
of rules governing mining in and around sites. Discomfort with
95. Weiss, supra note 54, at 352 ("International agreements need to be viewed as
living agreements, into which parties continuously breathe life and to which they give
new directions by acting as informal legislatures.").
96. See Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrange-
ments in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in In-
ternational Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 623, 625-28 (2000).
97. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 13(8).
98. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Centennial Essay: In Honor of the 100th Anniversary of
the AJIL and the ASIL: International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 Am. J. INT'L
L. 324, 343 (2006).
99. See Convention, supra note 3, at arts. 8-14.
100. Bodansky suggests that "few existing international environmental obligations
are the product of general consent." Bodansky, supra note 5, at 604. Obligations cre-
ated through mechanisms such as the Operational Guidelines are thus somewhat of a
rarity.
[Vol. 24
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/3
2007] MINING AND THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION55
the evolution of treaty norms with respect to World Heritage is
framed as a failure of democratic accountability as developments
occur without specific state consent. In the context of mining near
World Heritage Sites, a fear is expressed that the "dynamic evolu-
tion of treaty texts" will lead from a focus on "national sovereignty
over resource allocation decisions to more stringent regulation,
and even outright ban on such resource activities."10 1
1. State Party Consent for the Inscription of a
Property on the Danger List
The purpose of the Danger List is to alert the international
community to threats to World Heritage Sites. According to the
Convention website, however, inclusion on the Danger List,
"should... not be considered as a sanction, but as a system estab-
lished to respond to specific conservation needs in an efficient
manner. 10 2 Despite this characterization, the Danger List is typ-
ically regarded as a form of "name and shame,"10 3 and some coun-
tries have loudly objected to potential danger-listing of their
World Heritage Sites. Even the act of having Kakadu considered
for the Danger List was characterized as a "slap on the wrist for
Australia."1 0 4
As a result of poor drafting, ambiguity has surrounded the
question of whether a state must consent to having a property
within its territory added to the Danger List. The drafting history
of the Convention reveals that danger-listing should generally fol-
low the request of a Member State and "must not lead to any kind
of interference in the domestic affairs of the State or to any form of
internationalization." 0 5 The Operational Guidelines set out the
criteria for inscribing a site on the Danger List and require that
information regarding a potential threat to a Site be verified with
the State Party concerned and that comments from the State
Party be invited.10 6 This guidance, however, also contains the
101. Redgwell, supra note 19, at 198 (citing the "classic example" of the evolution of
the 1946 International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling "without recourse to
formal treaty amendment procedures").
102. World Heritage Centre, The List of World Heritage in Danger, http://www.
whc.unesco.orgpg.cfm?cid=158 (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
103. Redgwell, supra note 19, at 195.
104. Aplin, supra note 15, at 163.
105. U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Meeting of Experts to Es-
tablish an International System for the Protection of Monuments, Groups of Buildings
and Sites of Universal Interest: Final Report, 72, U.N. Doc. SHC/MD/4 (Nov. 10,
1969), available at http://whc.unesco.orglarchive/1969/shc-md-4e.pdf.
106. Operational Guidelines, supra note 9, IT 174-84.
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qualifying phrase "as far as possible," which leaves room for the
World Heritage Committee to act in more of a unilateral
fashion. 107
The Kakadu controversy coupled with threats to other World
Heritage Sites, including the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal, has
forced the Committee to clarify whether state consent is required
before a World Heritage Site can be added to the Danger List. In
an Extraordinary Session meeting in 2003, the Committee voted
to reject Australia's proposed amendment to the Operational
Guidelines that would give member states veto power over includ-
ing a World Heritage Site within its territory on the Danger
List. 0 8
This clarification may be perceived as an evolution in the
powers of the World Heritage Committee and is not one with
which all States Parties agree. 10 9 While the IUCN provides a co-
gent legal analysis articulating why the Committee has the power
to place properties on the Danger List without State Party con-
sent,110 the drafting history of the Convention reveals ambiguity
on this point and provides evidence that this may not have been
the intention of the Convention drafters."' The IUCN legal anal-
ysis distinguishes between "ordinary circumstances" where the in-
107. Id. at 183.
108. The Committee instead maintained the existing procedures for inscription on
the Danger List. U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], World Heritage
Comm., Decisions Adopted by the World Heritage Committee at its 6th Extraordinary
Session, U.N. Doc. WHC-03/6 EXT.COM/8 (May 27, 2003), available at http://whc.
unesco.org/archive/whc03-6extcom-confO8e.pdf.
109. The United States, for example, continues to take the position that state con-
sent is required before a site can be added to the List of World Heritage in Danger.
See Position of the United States of America on Climate Change with Respect to the
World Heritage Convention and World Heritage Sites, http://www.elaw.org/assets/
word/u.s.climate.US%20position%20paper.doc (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
110. See IUCN -The World Conservation Union, Draft Operational Guidelines, An
Analysis of the Legal Issues: Responding to the 2nd Draft Operational Guidelines and
Issues Raised During the Drafting Group of October 2001, at 4-9 (May 14, 2002),
available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/pubs/pdfs/heritage/IUCNLEGAL
ANALYSIS 14thMay2002.pdf.
111. See U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Draft Report: Special
Committee of Government Experts to Prepare a Draft Convention and a Draft Recom-
mendation to Member States Concerning the Protection of Monuments, Groups of
Buildings and Sites, 27, U.N. Doc. SHC.72/CONF.37/19 (1972), available at http:ll
whc.unesco.org/archive/1972/shc-72-conf37-19e.pdf ("These two lists are to be regu-
larly kept up to date and distributed, and international assistance is to be used for
property appearing in either one of these lists or in both of them. The inclusion of a
property in these lists requires the consent of the State Party concerned. Although a
request by the latter will be necessary before a property may be included in the 'List
of World Heritage in Danger', the Committee will be able to include a property in the
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scription of a property on the Danger List presupposes a "request
for assistance" and cases of "urgent need" where the Committee is
empowered under Section 4 of Article 11 of the Convention to in-
scribe a property on the Danger List absent a request for assis-
tance, request for inscription, or the consent of the State Party.112
Thus, in a departure from the traditional practice of not placing a
site on the Danger List unless the State Party had first made such
a request, the Committee added the old city of Dubrovnik to the
Danger List without waiting first for a request for assistance. 113
2. Buffer Zones
Buffer zones provide a further example of an obligation that is
not in the Convention but was introduced through the Operational
Guidelines.11 4 The concept of a buffer zone reflects the principle
that "World Heritage sites should be surrounded by concentric re-
gions of graduated restrictiveness to provide a margin of safety
around the sites themselves." 15 The Operational Guidelines re-
quire the creation of adequate buffer zones "[wiherever necessary
for the proper conservation of the property."116 If buffer zones are
not included in a nomination, the burden is on the State Party to
explain why they are not required. 1 7
'World Heritage List' without the State concerned having requested it, but on condi-
tion that it consents." (emphasis added)).
112. U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], World Heritage Comm.,
Item 4 of the Provision Agenda: Policy/Legal Issues Concerning Inscription of Proper-
ties on the List of World Heritage in Danger and the Potential Deletion of Properties
from the World Heritage List, $ 24, U.N. Doc. WHC-03/6 Ext.ComINF.4A (Dec. 3,
2002) [hereinafter Policy/Legal Issues Report]. Article 11(4) of the Convention pro-
vides that "[t]he Committee may at any time, in case of urgent need, make a new
entry in the List of World Heritage in Danger and publicize such entry immediately."
Convention, supra note 3, art. 11(4).
113. Dubrovnik was threatened by the armed conflict erupting over the breakup of
the former Yugoslavia. For other examples of Committee practice of inscription of
threatened properties on the Danger List without a request for assistance, see Policy !
Legal Issues Report, supra note 112, at 1$ 62-64.
114.' A buffer zone is defined as "an area surrounding the nominated property
which has complementary legal and/or customary restrictions placed on its use and
development to give an added layer of protection to the property." Operational Guide-
lines, supra note 9, 104. The same paragraph provides in vague language that "the
area constituting the buffer zone should be determined in each case through appropri-
ate mechanisms." Id.
115. John Charles Kunich, Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Threatening
the World's Ocean Hotspots, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 69-70 (2005).
116. Operational Guidelines, supra note 9, 103.
117. Id. 106
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Buffer zones, as the Yellowstone controversy illustrates, are
contentious and the subject of democratic concern-particularly
given their potential to encroach on the property rights of private
landowners. Prior to the danger listing of Yellowstone National
Park in 1995, President Clinton issued an order that effectively
created buffer zones around this national park.118 This order "led
to allegations that the World Heritage Convention had played a
significant role in land management decisions concerning federal
lands, thereby impinging on U.S. sovereignty."'1 9
The buffer zone requirements currently articulated in the Op-
erational Guidelines do not appear be rigorously enforced. Many
sites added to the list do not include buffer zones. The practice of
failing to respect this provision of the Operational Guidelines and
of nominating sites without buffer zones reflects the lack of state
consensus underlying this requirement.
3. Mining and World Heritage: The Locus of
Decision-making
There is no express prohibition on all mining within World
Heritage Sites in the text of the Convention nor is it clear that
such a sweeping prohibition could be implied from the Convention
text. It may be that certain mining activities either in or near
World Heritage Sites would lead to a breach of the Convention.
The World Heritage Committee has taken some steps to ad-
dress the uncertainty and lack of clarity with respect to mining
and World Heritage Sites. Much of the work in this area has been
done by the IUCN, which advises the Committee on issues affect-
ing natural heritage. In 2000, the IUCN's World Conservation
Congress adopted Recommendation 2.82 (the Amman Recommen-
dation), which declared that mining should be "prohibited by law"
in four categories of protected areas. 120 The Position Statement on
Mining and Associated Activities in Relation to Protected Areas, on
118. Machado, supra note 66, at 124.
119. Id.
120. IUCN World Conservation Congress, Protection and Conservation of Biologi-
cal Diversity of Protected Areas from the Negative Impacts of Mining and Exploration,
Recommendation 2.82 (Oct. 4-11, 2000), available at http://www.uicn.org/amman/
content/resolutions/rec82.pdf. The recommendation was adopted by a show of hands,
with the delegation from the United States voting against the recommendation and
making a formal Statement for the Record outlining its opposition based on the pre-
mise that "[mlining policy is an internal matter for sovereign states." IUCN - The
World Conservation Union, World Conservation Congress, Anman, Jordan, Oct. 4-11,
2000, Proceedings, 29 (2001), available at http://app.iucn.org/congress/general/aman-
resolutions/Proceedings-ENG.pdf.
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which the Amman Recommendation was based, was submitted as
a working document to the World Heritage Committee. 121 This
submission fostered much debate within the Committee. 122 The
Delegate of Canada articulated support for the adoption of this
document. 23 The United States, however, required reassurance
that the document was "for information purposes only.' 24 And
the official record duly noted that the Position Statement was "not
recommended for adoption by the Committee."125
Following recommendations of the Committee, a Technical
Workshop on World Heritage and Mining took place in Gland,
Switzerland in 2000, with the IUCN, UNESCO, the Committee,
and the International Council of Metals and Environment (repre-
senting the mining industry) as participants. The Workshop's re-
port1 26 was discussed at the twenty-fourth session of the
Committee, 27 and a Working Group on World Heritage and Min-
ing was created at the Committee's request. As a follow-up to the
Committee's recommendations, a workshop on "No Go Areas" was
hosted by the World Resources Institute and Placer Dome in 2001.
The absence of clear national or international rules clarifying
the relationship between mining and World Heritage Sites has led
to initiatives emerging outside governmental or intergovernmen-
tal processes. One such process resulted in the August 2003 No
Go Pledge, in which a number of the world's largest mining com-
panies participated. Fifteen corporate members of the Interna-
tional Council on Mining & Metals ("ICMM") committed to not
explore nor mine in World Heritage properties and to take steps to
121. IUCN World Comm'n on Protected Areas, Position Statement on Mining and
Associated Activities in Relation to Protected Areas (Apr. 1999), available at http:/!
www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/pubs /pdfs/miningposition99.pdf.
122. See U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org., World Heritage Comm., 23rd
Sess., Marrakesh, Morroco, Nov. 29 - Dec. 4, 1993, Report, X.53-54, U.N. Doc. WHC-
99/CONF.209/22 (Mar. 2, 2000), available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1999/whc-
99-conf209-22e.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Technical Workshop on World Heritage and Mining, Gland, Switz., Sept. 21-
23, 2000, Workshop Report (June 2001), available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/
wcpa/pubs/pdfs/HeritageMining.pdf.
127. U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org., Bureau of the World Heritage Comm.,
Information Document: Report of the Technical Workshop on "World Heritage and
Mining," U.N. Doc. No. WHC-2000/CONF.203/1NF.7 (Oct. 12, 2000), available at
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2000/whc-00-conf203-inf'7e.pdf; U.N. Educ., Scientific,
& Cultural Org., World Heritage Comm., 24th Sess., Cairns, Austl., Nov. 27-Dec. 2,
2000, Report, U.N. Doc. WHC-2000/CONF.204/21 (Feb. 16, 2001), available at http:l!
whc.unesco.org/archive/2000/whc-00-conf2O4-2 le.pdf.
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ensure that "existing operations in World Heritage properties as
well as existing and future operations adjacent to World Heritage
properties are not incompatible with the outstanding universal
value for which these properties are listed, and do not put the in-
tegrity of these properties at risk."128
The No Go Pledge was the product of the ICMM's effort, and
not a collaborative or multi-stakeholder initiative. It was, how-
ever, motivated by earlier dialogues with the IUCN surrounding
the issue of mining and World Heritage Sites and by fear, on the
part of the mining industry, that in the wake of the Amman Reso-
lution and controversy over projects such as the Jabiluka mine,
reputational risk might get out of hand.
The 2003 No Go Pledge was copied by the Royal Dutch/Shell
Group on August 27, 2003 with "a commitment not to explore for
or develop oil and gas resources within natural World Heritage
Sites. ' 129 Goldman Sachs made a similar pledge on December 20,
2005 committing itself to "not knowingly finance extractive
projects or commercial logging in World Heritage sites." 130
These private initiatives to define global rules surrounding
natural resource extraction and World Heritage Sites are increas-
ingly common given the current favour for "deregulatory" initia-
tives at the international level. They form part of a growing
number of attempts to enunciate international standards or rules
outside a framework of intergovernmental agreement. 131 These
processes are not intended to be open, inclusive, or democratic.
Their emergence should highlight some of the democracy-enhanc-
128. Int'l Council on Mining & Metals, Position Statement: Mining and Protected
Areas (Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://www.icmm.com/publications/758ICMMPos.
StatementonMiningandProtectedAreas.pdf.
129. SIR PHILLIP WATTS, ROYAL DUTCH/ SHELL GROUP, WORKING TOGETHER FOR
BIODIVERSITY (Aug. 27, 2003), available at http://www.shell.com/static/media-en/
downloads/speeches/pbw bio 27082003.pdf
130. UNESCO World Heritage Centre, Goldman Sachs Declares World Heritage
Sites "Off Limits" (Dec. 20, 2005), http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/216 (emphasis omit-
ted) (quoting Goldman Sachs Environmental Policy Framework, http://www2.
goldmansachs.com/out irm/our-culture/corporate-citizenship/environmental-policy-
framework/docs/EnvironmentalPolicyFramework.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2006)).
131. Other recent global initiatives to define acceptable standards for natural re-
source extraction projects largely outside the scope of intergovernmental processes
include the Equator Principles for project finance, and the Mining, Minerals and Sus-
tainable Development ("MMSD") Initiative. For an examination of the World Bank's
Social and Environmental Guidelines as an emerging source of "global rules" for cor-
porations, public, and private financial institutions as well as governments and ex-
port credit agencies, see Natasha Affolder, Cachet not Cash: A Different Sort of World
Bank Borrowing, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. (2006).
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ing qualities of existing intergovernmental environmental
regimes.
V. PARTICIPATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN
DECISION-MAKING
A final aspect of the democracy problem in the Convention
concerns problems of participation and transparency in decision-
making. This includes concerns about the composition of the
Committee, access to information, and participation in decision-
making on the part of interested organizations and individuals.
On its face, the Convention does not appear open to participants
other than States Parties and the Convention's advisory bodies
nor transparent in terms of its decision-making. However, such a
formalistic critique of the treaty is misleading.
While the Convention does not formally provide for the public
dissemination of its decisions, information about the workings of
the Committee including reports of the meetings of States Parties
and Committee deliberations are publicly available on UNESCO's
comprehensive website. The Committee-and its advisory bod-
ies-are also frequently provided with information from a range of
NGOs. NGOs occupy the crucial role of "watch-dog," alerting the
Committee about threats to sites and the inadequacy of protection
measures. 132 While only States Party representatives may submit
nominations for World Heritage Sites, requests for danger listing
can come from any source-in fact, the Committee has relied on
NGO submissions in a number of danger listing decisions. 133
NGOs, in joint initiatives with academic institutions, have been
132. The IUCN maintains ongoing correspondence with NGOs, park managers,
and research organizations with respect to individual sites. Examples of such corre-
spondence for the year 2002 include correspondence from WWF Australia on the
Great Barrier Reef, the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society on Nahanni National
Park, Flora and Fauna International on Mount Nimba Strict Nature Reserve in
Guinea/ C6te d'Ivoire, the Charles Darwin Research Station on the Galapagos, Ecua-
dor, SOSNA (a Slovak environmental NGO) on the Caves of the Aggtelek Karst and
Slovak Karst in Hungary/ Slovakia, and the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund on Virunga
National Park, Democratic Republic of Congo. IUCN - The World Conservation
Union, IUCN Report on the State of Conservation of Natural and Mixed Sites In-
scribed on the World Heritage List (Apr. 25, 2002), available at http://www.iucn.org/
themes/wcpa/pubs/pdfs/heritage/socreports/SOC25%20April2002.pdf.
133. Conservation groups provided information to the Committee on the threats
posed by mining in both the New World Mine and Jabiluka mine debates.
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particularly active in compiling petitions for danger-listing of sites
as a result of the threats posed by climate change.134
Active involvement of NGOs in the Convention can be viewed
either as a sign of the democratic health of the regime 135 or, con-
versely, as an indicator of its anti-democratic nature, revealing
the extent to which interest groups dominate global institu-
tions. 136 The Convention provides that NGO's "with similar objec-
tives" to the IUCN, ICOMOS and ICCROM may "attend the
meetings of the Committee in an advisory capacity."137 The
Guidelines make no provision for other non-States Party actors
such as mining companies or sub-federal actors (such as provinces
or states). The Committee was thus unsure how it should react to
a Queensland delegation that, in 1988, arrived in Paris to formally
object to the Queensland Rainforest World Heritage Site listing.
Ultimately, at the suggestion of the Canadian delegate, the
Queensland contingent was allowed to attend the meeting and the
Queensland Environment Minister was allowed to speak.138 Simi-
larly, mining companies have not been welcomed into Committee
meetings, although they have been permitted to provide the Com-
mittee with written submissions.
A. The Committee
The twenty-one member elected Committee does not attract
the allegations of domination by a small group of nations or lack of
representation of developing countries that undermines other in-
134. See, e.g., ERICA THORSON ET AL., INT'L ENVTL. LAW PROJECT, LEWIS & CLARK
LAW SCHOOL, PETITION TO THE WORLD HERITAGE COMMITTEE REQUESTING INCLUSION
OF WATERTON-GLACIER INTERNATIONAL PEACE PARK ON THE LIST OF WORLD HERITAGE
IN DANGER AS A RESULT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND
ACTIONS (2006), available at http://aw.lclark.edu/org/ielp/glacierpetition.html; SYD-
NEY CENTRE FOR INT'L AND GLOBAL LAW, UNIV. OF SYDNEY, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
AND THE GREAT BARRIER REEF: AUSTRALIA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WORLD HERITAGE
CONVENTION (2004), available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/scigl/SCIGLFinalReport
21 09 -04.pdf.
135. See Raustiala, supra note 42, at 415 ("Broadening the scope of popular and
interest-group participation in international law-making is, in my view, not anti-dem-
ocratic but pro-democratic.").
136. See Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the American Constitution-Some-
thing's Got to Give, NAT'L INT., Spring 1999, at 39 ("Actual governments can be
awkward for UN agencies. It is usually much easier to deal with constituencies that
do not themselves have to pay UN bills or submit to UN directives. NGOs-a sort of
phantom citizenry-are the perfect partners for the phantom authority exercised by
UN agencies.").
137. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 8(3).
138. Thomas H. Edmonds, The Queensland Rainforest and Wetlands Conflict: Aus-
tralia's External Affairs Power, 20 ENVTL. L. 387, 411 (1990).
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ternational organizations such as the Security Council or World
Trade Organization ("WTO"). Since the Committee was created,
Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Lebanon, and Senegal have collectively
served on the Committee for a total of eighty-seven years (fifteen
mandates); comparatively, the UN Security Council's "Big Five"
(China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
Russian Federation) have collectively served for only sixty years
(nine mandates). 139 Calls for new procedures such as quotas to
ensure better regional representation are still voiced, although to
date they have been resisted by the Committee. 140
While the Committee has included a diversity of States Par-
ties in its membership, problems of balance in terms of the current
World Heritage List remain. Of the 812 properties included on
the World Heritage List as of May 2006, 628 are cultural sites,
and only 160 are sites of natural heritage. 141 The Committee has
also noted the lack of protected sites in developing countries: "It is
generally recognized that the cultural properties inscribed on the
World Heritage List do not truly reflect the cultural and geograph-
ical diversity of human achievement." 42 In response to these im-
balances, the Committee has adopted a global strategy to achieve
the goal of establishing a "representative, balanced and credible
World Heritage List."'1 43 The Committee has also revised the Op-
erational Guidelines to limit the number of nominations from
countries with sites already on the list and to request that States
Parties "consider whether their heritage is already well repre-
sented on the List and if so to slow down their rate of submission
of further nominations.' 44
139. This information is taken from U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org., Item 9
of the Provisional Agenda: Elections to the World Heritage Committee, WHC-03/
14.GA/INF.9B (July 9, 2003), available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2003/whc03-
14ga-inf09be.pdf.
140. The Committee has rejected as "rigid" and unsuitable suggestions that it
should consider establishing new procedures for elections such as regional quotas to
ensure effective representation of regions and cultures. U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cul-
tural Org., Equitable Representation of Different Regions and Cultures of the World, 1-
3, U.N. Doc. CC-90/CONF.004/INF.4 (Nov. 9, 1990), available at http://whc.unesco.
orglarchive/1990/cc-90-conf004-inf4e.pdf.
141. The other 24 are mixed properties. WORLD HERITAGE CENTRE, supra note 11.
142. Int'l Council on Monuments & Sites, Proposals for Achieving a More Represen-
tative Sample of Cultural Heritage on the World Heritage List (Dec. 1997), available at
http:/whc.unesco.org/wg-replist/icomos-imbalance.htm.
143. Operational Guidelines, supra note 9, T 54.
144. Id. 59.
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B. Expert Decision-making
Expert decision-making and participatory processes tradition-
ally rely on conflicting bases of legitimacy. 145 Of these two bases
of legitimacy, the World Heritage regime relies most strongly on
appeals to expertise. The expertise of the Committee and its advi-
sory bodies are invoked to buttress individual decisions and make
them appear less political, more objective, and more palatable.
This invites the claim that:
scientific objectivity has facilitated regime maintenance [in the
case of the Committee].... Despite a lack of formal enforcement
powers, the [World Heritage Committee] has been able to rely
on objective and neutral scientific evidence to avoid the
politicisation of decision-making processes and to enhance com-
pliance. It has even been successful in persuading state parties
to review and rescind decisions that could otherwise damage im-
portant heritage-listed sites.146
Such claims obfuscate the inescapable reality that many is-
sues the Committee decides, such as the threats posed by mines
situated in and around World Heritage Sites, involve not only
technical questions, but also questions of values. An approach
where primacy is given to science is not always followed. 147 Scien-
tific findings are contested,"48 and the credibility of scientific "ex-
perts" attacked. 149  Finally, invoking "expertise" can also
undermine democratic participation, at both the national and in-
ternational levels.
The involvement of "experts" in the decision-making process
means as soon as an issue is institutionally construed as demand-
ing expertise (e.g. the identification of world heritage values), the
scope for legitimate participation is markedly diminished. "Only
those larger environmental groups with scientific and technical
145. Bodansky, supra note 5, at 620 ("Expert decision making stands in sharp con-
trast to public participation.").
146. Maswood, supra note 17, at 357.
147. Consider the decision of the Committee not to add Kakadu to the Danger List
despite the recommendations of the Committee's "expert" advisory bodies.
148. The scientific findings relied on by the expert bodies questioned the science
behind the Australian government's Environmental Impact Study (EIS). See Mas-
wood, supra note 17, at 364.
149. Australian Federal Environment Minister Robert Hill attacked the credibility
and independence of the IUCN and ICOMOS following their Mission to Kakadu. See
Sophie Boukhari, The Kakadu Affair Shakes the Heritage World, UNESCO COURIER,
October 1999, at 12, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.orgimages/0011/001174/
117419e.pdf.
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information/resources (e.g. the Australian Conservation Founda-
tion), are in a position to challenge or question the credibility of
government decisions."15 o
The relationship between protected areas and natural re-
source extraction is deeply value-laden and is an issue on which
domestic consensus is difficult to forge.' 5 ' Many resource-rich
countries like Canada and Australia have complicated and un-
resolved legal regimes governing mining in and around protected
areas.152 Whether mining should be allowed in and around World
Heritage Sites is not a question that science on its own can an-
swer. Thus, expertise alone is unlikely to provide a sufficient ba-
sis for legitimizing international rules on mining and World
Heritage Sites.
VI. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
AND THE THREATS TO COMPLIANCE
Why is it that the democracy-enhancing qualities of interna-
tional environmental treaties are so infrequently discussed? Are
democratic deficits so much more pervasive, or just more interest-
ing? Peter Sand reminds us that the "essence of environmental
public trusteeship, as embodied in the [World Heritage] Conven-
tion, is the democratic accountability of states for their manage-
ment of trust resources in the interest of the beneficiaries-the
world's 'peoples'.' 153 The Convention thus holds States Parties re-
sponsible for the protection of World Heritage Sites situated
within their borders. It does so by listening to the concerns of non-
state and sub-state interests and by raising issues that states may
prefer to suppress.
In the context of disputes between mining and World Heri-
tage Site protection, compliance with the objectives of the Conven-
tion will be fostered by two developments: (1) the clear
150. Benjamin J. Richardson, A Study of Australian Practice Pursuant to the World
Heritage Convention, 20 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 143, 150 (1990).
151. Witness the heated debates over oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge.
152. In both countries jurisdictions alternatively ban mining in parks, allow pre-
existing mining rights in parks, allow new mining rights to be created, and/ or permit
exploration. For the Australian regime, see BOER & WIFFEN, supra note 57, at 234.
For Canada, see DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAw 172 (2003).
153. Peter H. Sand, Global Environmental Change and the Nation State: Sover-
eignty Bounded?, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW 519, 537 (Gerd Winter ed.,
2006).
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articulation of rules surrounding world heritage and mining; and
(2) the dispelling of myths and misunderstandings surrounding
the processes of World Heritage Site listing and danger-listing.
Additionally, further research is needed assessing the effective-
ness of the existing mechanisms for promoting compliance with
the Convention, particularly the institution of the Danger List.
This research should ask whether the Danger List is an effective
model for other environmental law treaties.154
Measuring compliance requires assessing the conformity be-
tween a state's behaviour and a treaty's explicit rules. One of the
greatest challenges for assessing compliance with the World Heri-
tage Convention remains the vagueness surrounding expressed
obligations in the treaty. This vagueness reflects the unresolved
balancing of communal obligations and state sovereignty and the
sacrificing of precision to secure universal acceptance.
The Convention faces serious challenges in the coming years.
Increasing population, demand for natural resources, and other
development pressures will create inevitable conflict with a re-
gime designed to conserve areas of outstanding natural and cul-
tural heritage. Accusations of democratic illegitimacy pose less
obvious-but nonetheless significant-threats to the future effec-
tiveness of the Convention.
154. The author is currently completing an in-depth review of Danger Listings and
threatened Danger Listings in an attempt to answer this question.
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